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Abstract 
Scientific rhetoric can have a profound impact on the perception of research; it can also drive 
and direct further research efforts. What determines whether results are discussed in a 
neutral or a judgmental way? How convincing must results be so that authors call for 
significant policy changes? These questions are difficult to answer, because rhetoric on the 
one hand, and content and methodology of research on the other hand, cannot be separated 
easily. We use a unique example to examine this question empirically: the analysis of gender 
wage differentials. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition represents a standard research 
method that compares male and female earnings, holding productivity constant. We analyze 
the wording in these studies and their prevalence to ask for policy intervention. Furthermore, 
we examine whether the rhetoric used reveals an author's prejudice on the topic which may 
also be reflected in data selection and thereby his or her findings. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Economists like to think of themselves as purely rational, objective researchers who use 
scientific methods to gain quantifiable results. They claim to be unaffected by personal values 
in their research since scientific techniques would guarantee objective findings. However, 
what they say and do may be two different things. As McCloskey has put it "Economists do 
not follow the laws of enquiry their methodologies lay down" (1983; 168). 
One the one hand, typically a whole number of scientifically acknowledged methods 
are available to the researcher and the choice of these might affect the result. One the other 
hand, there are different ways of presenting the same finding. In their dialogs, economists try 
to "persuade" each other of their hypotheses, models, or empirical results. For this they use 
their language, "the aptness of economic metaphors, the relevance of historical precedents, the 
persuasiveness of introspection, the power of authority, the charm of symmetry, the claims of 
morality" (McCloskey, 1983; 482). 
For persuading others they often also make use of words and phrases which suggest 
certain connotations and interpretations; e.g. terms like efficiency, equilibrium, stability, 
maximization and the like which evoke scientific power (McCloskey, 1998). Even when 
discussing one's results there is a lot of room for interpretation. Particularly if there are no 
comparable studies an author might regard an estimated effect as rather big or “statistically 
significant but economically of second-order importance”. (S)he can use suggestive or neutral 
terms when interpreting the result or can call for economic policies to fight apparent 
economic or social ills. 
In contrast to previous papers on rhetoric in economics1 we use a purely empirical 
research strategy. We examine a specific example in the economic literature: the calculation 
of the gender wage gap. The advantage of investigating a narrow topic such as the gender 
wage gap is that it restricts the analysis to papers which all tackle the same clear question: do 
equally productive females earn less than corresponding males? Furthermore, there exists a 
standardized research method, which has been internationally adopted to examine the gender 
wage differential. The Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) approach allows to decompose 
gender wage differentials into two parts: one part which is driven by different productivity 
                                                 
1 Discussions in the popular press on the rhetoric of economists is often concerned with its apparent dullness. 
The economic rhetoric is characterized as brimming with too many Greek-letters and figures (See Reeves, 2003 
for a report on the Royal Economic Society Annual Meeting). 
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(usually called “endowment effect” or “productivity effect”) and the rest. Some researchers 
call the second part “discrimination effect”, others use the term "unexplained residual" 
because unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. the fact that men are more productive than women in 
their unobservable characteristics, might cause the results.2  The term "sex discrimination" is 
more likely to be used by authors who believe that discrimination exists and is a social 
problem, while those who believe in the perfect functioning of free (input) markets will be 
more likely to speak of "unexplained residuals". Ideology, therefore, may affect the wording.  
Generally, in the economic literature, the rhetoric of an author, the content and results of 
the analysis and the methods or methodology cannot be separated easily, because they are 
mutually dependent. Focusing on the gender wage gap, we avoid this problem since the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is such a standard procedure that it is used by anybody 
interested in the gender wage differential. Therefore, even though there are some variations to 
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the general method to analyze gender wage differentials is 
practically given.  
Our empirical strategy is to look at published papers on the gender wage gap and explore 
their rhetoric, in particular the way how the authors describe their results. Section 2 quickly 
reviews the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique which all the papers we investigate 
make use of, section 3 then describes our data set of previously published papers and the way 
we searched for our data. Section 4 analyzes the use of the word discrimination in the text and 
title of a research paper. Can we find any evidence, that attitudes and demographic 
characteristics of the author or the quality of research determine the terminology used? 
Rhetoric in describing one’s results is one thing, calling for (drastic) policy reforms is another 
– some might say “a more serious” thing. In the following section 5 we examine whether 
attitudes of authors and quality of the empirical estimate affect the occurrence and severity of 
policy recommendations to overcome the gender wage gap. Finally, in section 6 we look at 
more indirect forms of persuasion than rhetoric: in the course of an empirical project, there 
are many cross-roads one can take in terms of data selection, which might be reasonable and 
arguable, but which tend to lead the researcher to particular results. Section 7 concludes. 
                                                 
2 It is interesting to note that both, Blinder (1973) as well as Oaxaca (1973), used the term discrimination. 
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2 Estimates for gender effects on wages  
 
The standard procedure to investigate differences in wages is the one developed by Blinder 
(1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Wages are estimated separately for individuals i of the different 
groups g, males and females, which allows that productive characteristics of men and women 
are rewarded differently: 
gigiggi XW εβ += ,  (1.1) 
g = (m, f) represents the two sexes; Wgi is the log wage and Xgi the control characteristics of 
an individual i of group g. 
The total difference in mean wages of men and women can then be decomposed into two 
parts: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )   m f m f m m f fW W X X X E CEβ β β− = − + − ≡ + ,  (1.2) 
where gW  and gX  denote the mean log wages and productivity characteristics of group g and 
ˆ
gβ  represents the estimated parameters from equation (1.1). While the first term stands for 
the effect of different productive characteristics (the endowment effect E), the second term 
represents the gender effect which is due to differences in the estimated coefficients for both 
groups and is often referred to as "discrimination effect". Other authors emphasize that men 
may still be more productive than women even if unobservable in the data and refer to it as 
“unexplained residual”. Others again, although the minority, try to avoid both terms by 
referring e.g. to a "price effect", "sex effect" or "unequal treatment". In the following we will 
refer to this estimated wage component CE as the "calculated effect" which authors present in 
their study.  
 Since the first use in the early seventies, hundreds of authors have adopted and also 
extended the Blinder-Oaxaca approach.3 We investigated their papers to analyze the rhetoric 
they use when presenting their results. The word "unexplained residual" might be used either 
if an author does not believe in the existence of discrimination at all or if (s)he tries to leave 
the interpretation up to the reader. In principle, a positive unexplained residual can be 
reconciled with zero discrimination or with any amount of discrimination that lies between 
                                                 
3 Later, some refinements of the decomposition technique have been introduced by e.g. Brown et al. (1980), 
Reimers (1983), Cotton (1988), and Neumark (1988). Papers using any of these techniques have also been 
considered in our analysis. 
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zero and the calculated effect.4 In terms of persuasion, therefore, people who believe that sex 
discrimination exists and is a social ill will be more likely to name their empirical results 
"discrimination" to encourage the reader to interpret it accordingly. Others, who believe that 
markets correctly assess and reward market productivity will be more likely to use the term 
"unexplained residual" if they find differences in wages which cannot be attributed to 
observable personal characteristics. 
 
 
3 Data 
 
In November 2000, we searched the Economic Literature Index for any reference to: "(wage* 
or salar* or earning*) and (discrimination or differen*) and (sex or gender)". This search 
strategy led us to 1541 references. After examination of abstracts and articles we identified 
192 empirical articles which used regression analysis and a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to 
analyze male-female wage differentials.5 
Since we wanted to examine how the rhetoric of a paper was determined by variables 
like the calculated effect or the methods used, we took into account all the different published 
estimates of one paper which were based on different methods and data sets and used the 
mean values of these variables for analysis. Figure 1 shows the use of the term discrimination 
over time: in the early 1970s about two thirds of authors (papers) called the calculated effect 
discrimination, whereas only about 20% of authors did so in the late 1990s. A similar picture 
can be found in the titles of the papers. While more than 50% of papers used the word 
discrimination in the title in the beginning of our period, this rate dropped to less than 20% at 
the end (see Figure 2). 
 
                                                 
4 In principle the discrimination effect could also be larger than the unexplained differential when men are doing 
worse in the unobservable than women, for example if they use drugs and are involved in illegitimate practices 
more frequently. 
5 A full list of papers included in this study can be downloaded from the following URL: 
 www.economics.uni-linz.ac.at/weichsel/work/rhetoric_papers.doc 
 Some empirical studies used regression analysis but no Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. In total 70 articles 
included only sex dummies in the wage regressions and were excluded from our study. Since these papers 
typically did not focus on gender wage differentials, their use here would have contaminated our experimental 
setting. 
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4 Do authors use the term discrimination? 
 
We investigated nearly 200 papers using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and its 
derivatives to analyze the rhetoric authors use when presenting their results. As this 
decomposition technique and its refinements are well defined and standard in the literature, a 
researcher knows exactly what (s)he is talking about technically, although he or she may 
interpret the “calculated effect” CE differently. Some may consider a positive CE as a proof 
for discrimination, and conclude that the government should take measures to fight it. Others 
may be less convinced that they have found true “discrimination”. In our analysis of whether 
wage differentials are assigned to discrimination we first only looked at the immediate 
discussion and interpretation of their calculated effect CE, not at the rhetoric the authors 
might have used in the introduction or conclusions of their paper. The reason is that also 
authors who do not believe in the existence of discrimination will still use the term throughout 
their paper to lay out their argument. A simple word count therefore would not be sufficient. 
One would have to evaluate whether the word discrimination was used in an affirmative or 
negative way and set the number of mentions in relation to the number of themes covered in 
the paper, which might be difficult to assess. The more clear-cut approach, however, is to 
simply analyze the discussion of the calculated effect since it is constitutional to the 
persuasive power of the argument. In a further analysis we also investigate the terminology in 
the title of a paper.6 
 
Determinates of economic rhetoric 
Which factors determine the terminology of an author? First candidates are beliefs, 
ideology and attitudes of the author. As direct information about the ideology of the 
researcher is not available in our case, we try to proxy the gender-related attitudes of the 
author by information about previous occupation with the topic. If an author has published on 
gender-related issues (in the last five years), we might assume, that he or she is more attached 
to the topic than others. The variable "number of previous gender papers" was created by 
searching for papers of the respective author via Econlit using the key-words "gender" or 
"sex" or "female" "women" (or woman) – going five years back. Additionally, we also 
include demographic information for being female or based at a U.S. institution.  
                                                 
6 Chevalier and Hudson (2001) conduct a similar quantitative text analysis when counting the occurrences of 
intentional terms in one volume of the Journal of Finance. 
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A second candidate is the calculated effect itself. The bigger it is, the more an author 
might be convinced that (at least a part) must be due to discrimination and not due to 
characteristics unobservable in the data. Factors which capture the reliability of the calculated 
effect may also determine the interpretation of the results. The decomposition analysis is 
meant to calculate the wage gap between equally productive males and females, where males 
and females are artificially made “equal” by the econometrician. If the author remains less 
convinced about the validity of his or her comparison, (s)he may be hesitant to call the 
decomposition result discrimination. We constructed several variables for the reliability of the 
calculated effect.7 The first quality measures are purely "study-based" and rely directly upon 
observable quality characteristics of the research paper. The variable "sound/elaborate 
method" measures whether a study used any of the more elaborate decomposition techniques 
as developed by Neumark, Reimers, Cotton, or Brown et al. "Good data", on the other hand, 
describes the quality of the data used. It captures whether the data provide hourly wages and 
actual work-experience, and also accounts for whether the data set is large (N > 1000) and 
comes from administrative sources.8 In the latter case the earnings data should be more 
reliable. Additionally, if the authors presented more estimates of the gender wage gap and/or 
had a higher R2 in the underlying wage regressions, we might consider the results as more 
trustworthy. 
Furthermore, we included more general,  "market-based" quality indicators in our study, 
capturing the quality of the research(er) via journal quality and previous publication record of 
the author. For the rank of a journal we used the citation-based journal rankings from Laband 
and Piette (1994).9 The variable "number of previous papers in core journals" counts the 
number of articles an author had published in the previous five years in one of the core 
journals as defined by Stigler et al. (1995).10  
                                                 
7 An obvious candidate would be to take the precision of the estimate (in general the standard error) as a quality 
indicator. However, this cannot be done in our case, because the precision of the calculated effect, the 
constructed indicator in the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, is usually not reported in the literature. See Silber 
and Weber (1999) for a bootstrap approach to construct standard errors for different decomposition procedures. 
8 The variable “good data” simply counts how many of the above mentioned characteristics apply. 
9 The 30 highest ranked journals were classified as "top journals", the following 40 journals as "medium 
journals". 
10 For multiple authors their mean values were taken. Stigler et al. (1995) define the following journals as "core 
journals": American Economic Review, Economic Journal, Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal 
of Monetary Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Review of Economic Studies. 
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The use of terminology in the text 
The results of our probit-analysis for the use of the term “discrimination” in the course of 
the discussion of the calculated effect are reported in Table (1).11 The first column includes 
only our proxy for attitudes and demographic characteristics of the authors, together with a 
time trend. It turns out that women are equally inclined to use the term “discrimination” as are 
men. However if they are co-authoring the paper with a male author; the probability to refer to 
discrimination is 20 percentage points lower. It might be the case, that such a mixed-sex pair 
is more conservative in its wording than other authors; they also may find it more difficult to 
agree on a joint rhetoric for their paper. However, this negative co-author effect does not 
apply to same-sex pairs. Authors who have a pronounced interest in the gender topic – shown 
by previous publications– do not use a different rhetoric. Authors from U.S. universities again 
use the term discrimination 24 percentage points less frequently. Also, over the years it seems 
to have become less popular to speak of discrimination.  
The next columns investigate the effect of quality characteristics of the research paper 
which reflect the reliability of the calculated gender wage gap. The coefficient for the 
calculated effect itself is positive as expected: the bigger the calculated difference the more 
likely authors are to use the word "discrimination". If the calculated effect is big, authors are 
more convinced that at least part of their result must be due to discrimination and not due to 
the neglect of an unobservable variable.12 We also find that top journals avoid the term 
"discrimination" more often.13 Including the research history of authors in our set of 
explanatory variables, we find that the more papers an author has previously published in core 
journals the less likely (s)he is to use the word “discrimination”. The effect is rather strong, 
one article reducing the probability by 20-30 percentage points. While “quality” of the author 
and the journal seem to indicate less willingness to refer to "discrimination", more direct, 
"study-based" indicators about the reliability of the research point in the opposite direction. 
The use of more sophisticated decomposition techniques, the availability of better data and – 
most prominently – a good explanation of wages via a high R2 in the original wage 
                                                 
11 In Table (5) in the Appendix we extend our analysis and distinguish between three categories: papers which 
call their calculated effects "unexplained residuals", "discrimination-effect" or use some other term, e.g. price or 
sex effect, unequal treatment, or salary differential. "Discrimination" is hereby considered the strongest 
expression - used in 41 % of papers, "unexplained residual" the weakest (used in 42 % of papers). The signs of 
the coefficients remain the same, but the level of significance somewhat decreases.  
12 Recall that the calculated effect (CE) represents the log wage differential as defined in (1.2). In our sample it 
has a mean of 0.193 and a standard deviation of 0.13. 
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regressions, all these factors increase the use of the term “discrimination” considerably and 
with sizable quantitative effects. Column (4) includes attitude and demographic 
characteristics as well as quality indicators to find the impact of the attitude and demographic 
indicators shrink somewhat. Column (5) indicates that a high calculated effect only leads the 
author to refer to "discrimination", if (s)he has also good data at disposal, as is shown by the 
interaction effect. These results indicate that the quality of the researcher and the research 
outlet has a different effect than the study-specific quality (reliability) of the actual paper. 
While the standard of the researcher and the outlet call for a more cautious and conservative 
wording, reliability of the research paper at hand calls for a more determined and pronounced 
standpoint. 
 
The use of terminology in the title 
 Apart from the rhetoric used in the text, we are also interested whether authors use the 
term discrimination in the title of their papers. Note, that the current experiment is less clear 
than the use of discrimination in the interpretation of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The 
title of the paper might relate to the potentially large number of themes covered in a paper; it 
might have questions in it (e.g. Is there sex discrimination in Chile?); or the author might 
simply want to relate the title to a thread of research papers. All this makes the interpretation 
of the title more difficult.  
The results of our probit analysis are presented in Table (2). As expected, the results 
are less precise than in Table (1). Two variables have a strong and consistent association with 
the probability of using the term "discrimination": sex and country of residence. We 
consistently find that women and U.S. authors more often abstain from the use of the word 
discrimination in the title of their papers. On the other hand, authors who used more 
sophisticated decomposition techniques, speak of "discrimination" more often. Since we used 
the full specifications from Table (1), we can also see which variables had no impact on the 
rhetoric in the title: neither the size of the calculated coefficient, previous occupation with the 
topic nor the quality of the journal had any impact on the wording.  
                                                                                                                                                        
13 Cherry and Feiner (1992) find that those journals abstracted in the Journal of Economic Literature, i.e. the 
more prestigious journals, reduced the number of articles on discrimination between 1972 and 1987, while the 
total number of papers on the topic remained roughly the same.  
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5 When do authors give policy recommendations? 
 
Since there seem to be major differences in the rhetoric of authors, which partly seem to rest 
upon author-specific characteristics, the next step will be to see whether such differences also 
appear with respect to policy recommendations. For example one could assume that people of 
a certain ideology, e.g. more liberal individuals, would be more likely than conservatives to 
assign differences in wages to discrimination. These authors then might also be more likely to 
advocate policy measures to combat labor market discrimination. Our prime interest is to 
understand, why authors call for policy intervention. Is it because they are particularly 
convinced of their empirical result (e.g. due to an exceptionally big calculated effect) or is it 
because of their biased attitudes and values?14 
We constructed three different indicators for policy recommendations. The variable 
"severity" captures how strong the proposed state intervention would be. It ranges from the 
explicit rejection to adopt measures (-1), over no recommendation (0) and rather general 
advise (e.g. "remove barriers for women", "encourage college choice of females", "discourage 
sex-discrimination", (1)), to explicit laws that either prohibit discrimination (e.g. equal pay 
act, anti-discrimination law, (2)) or actively promote female employment (e.g. affirmative 
action, (3)). The variable "determination of policy recommendation" is an index for how 
determined and convinced an author is that a proposed measure should be realized and would 
be successful. It captures whether an author argues a measure "may, might, could" (1)/ 
"should, can" (2)/ "will, would" (3) lead to particular consequences, or how necessary (s)he 
states it is.15 "Number of words" simply counts how many words a paper spends on policy 
recommendation. In total, 72 papers made any kind of policy proposal. 
In our regression models we included all previously mentioned regressors and added a 
dummy variable, whether in the paper the calculated effect was attributed to discrimination. 
The reason for including this variable was firstly that assigning differences in wages to 
discrimination might be a precondition to ask for policy interventions (if authors believe that 
men and women are different in unobservables by nature, this might not be open to change). 
Secondly, this dummy variable acts as a proxy for the ideological predisposition of an author. 
                                                 
14 See Fuchs, Krueger and Poterba (1998) on survey results on the importance of values for policy descriptions 
of labor and public economists. 
15 No suggestion of a measure is coded as 0. If an author included any additional reservation (e.g. the measure 
will possibly lead to…), this was accounted for by assigning a one point lower value. 
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Our different measures for policy conclusions lead to rather similar results. The main 
message of Table (3) is our inability to explain the variation in policy advice among authors 
by demographic characteristics, our indicators for their values and attitudes or by the quality 
and reliability of their research: neither female authors, nor those with a longer history in 
gender-related research, nor those having used the term discrimination in the interpretation of 
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition require more policy changes. This finding stands in 
contrast to Fuchs et al. (1998) who find that values of economists strongly affect their general 
policy positions. However, they also do not find a significant impact of (guessed) coefficient 
estimates on policy recommendations which corresponds to our results. This finding can be 
seen as reassuring if one accepts our indicators for underlying attitudes of the authors: 
Gender, ideology and values do not seem to influence policy advice of economists. Even 
among those authors who have been shown to interpret the calculated gender wage gap in a 
certain way – by calling it discrimination or unexplained residual – there is no difference in 
policy recommendations. This means that there are differences in the rhetoric of economists, 
but these do not explain the policy prescriptions of authors. However, one could argue that 
our indicators do not adequately capture ideology, and therefore the variation in the 
prevalence of giving policy advice cannot fully be explained.  
We also find no evidence of the impact of quality of the research and research outlet 
on policy recommendations. Only authors who used more sophisticated methods are more 
convinced about their own research output and use more words in their policy conclusions; 
those who presented a larger number of empirical results in their paper are, in turn, more 
reserved in giving advice. The number of authors a paper has, significantly reduces the 
number of words spent on policy recommendations. Probably, again, it is harder for a larger 
group of writers to reach a consensus. On the other hand, the number of words spent on policy 
as well as the determination of authors in their policy conclusions seem to increase over time. 
This is interesting if one considers previous results where we showed that the use of the term 
discrimination decreased over the years.  
 
 
6 Restrictions to data set 
 
The gender wage gap differs greatly for different subgroups within a population. For example 
for new entries in the labor market we typically observe lower differences in wages. The same 
is true for the public sector and for never-married individuals. If wage differentials are 
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calculated for individuals within a rather narrowly defined occupation the gender wage gap is 
typically lower than when people of all different job types are investigated. Also women in 
high prestige occupations are typically confronted with a smaller pay gap than those in low 
prestige occupation.16  
Some data sets only cover a very specific group of individuals, e.g. exist for a specific 
occupation only or for a particular group of people (like new entries). Consequently, the 
choice of data a researcher uses will crucially affect the calculated gender wage gap. 
Obviously, the reader of a paper which is based on a restricted data set will usually be aware 
that the applicability of the calculated outcome is restricted to the investigated subgroup and 
should interpret the results accordingly. However, in terms of "persuasion", choosing a 
restricted data set, which leads to a lower calculated effect than would be obtained for an 
entire sample of the population, tends to create the impression that differences in earnings 
between the sexes are a minor economic problem.17 Therefore, researchers who want to 
convince their audience either about the importance or irrelevance of discrimination may base 
their analysis on selective data sets.  
For our analysis we created a variable that counts the number of data set restrictions 
that a research paper is based on. The number of restrictions which increase the gender wage 
gap entered this variable additively; restrictions decreasing the gap were subtracted.18 If 
authors used representative data but calculated effects for different subgroups of an entire 
population in their paper this was not considered a restriction, since a full picture of the entire 
population was presented. 25 % of all investigated papers were based on at least one - up to 
three - restrictions generally thought as reducing the gender wage gap. Only 4 % of authors 
used one restriction which increases the gap compared to the entire population.19  
The goal of our investigation was to examine whether attitudes or research quality 
were correlated with an author's choice of data. In Table 4 we examine the use of restricted 
                                                 
 
16 See Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) for a meta-analysis of gender wage gap studies, who show 
these regularities. 
17 See DeMarzo et al. (2003) for a formal bounded rationality model of opinion formation, where people have a 
persuasion bias. They argue that readers should in principle make the right discount for – in our case – a selected 
data set, but often they fail to do so; especially if they get a particular message repeatedly. Without such a 
persuasion bias, many phenomena in political and economic marketing could not be explained. 
18 As restrictions lowering the gender wage gap we considered the following subgroups: new-entries, never 
married individuals, workers in the public sector, in a specific narrow occupation and in high-prestige 
occupations. Only investigating the private sector, low prestige occupations and married people was considered 
as increasing the wage differential. 
19 It should be noted, that using a restricted data set may be good concerning the reliability of the research result, 
because individuals are better comparable within a subset of the population. However, here we investigate 
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data sets via an ordered probit model. In column (1) we only include proxies for attitudes 
(including rhetoric) as well as demographic variables of the author: neither gender nor 
previous occupation with gender topics are related to the use of selective data sets. Moreover, 
our indicators for attitudes, like the use of discrimination to describe the gender wage gap as 
well as the quest for policy conclusions20, are unrelated to the choice of data restrictions. 
These results are reassuring again: Authors might differ in their assessment and their rhetoric 
describing a phenomenon, but this does not influence important decisions in the course of the 
empirical work. Over our observed time span from the 1070s to the 1990s, however, authors 
reduced their use of restrictions which tend to lower the gender wage gap. 
In column (2), only indicators for quality of research paper and author are included 
with some control variables. We find that papers which restrict their analysis to a subset of a 
population with a lower gender wage gap are more often published in top and medium ranked 
journals. This correlation may be due to editorial policy or simply to the quality of the 
respective papers. A narrower data set might be seen as a quality indicator as it makes the 
essential problem of the calculation of the gender wage gap easier and compares likes with 
likes. Column (3) provides a full specification which confirms previous results. 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
Economists, when publishing academic papers, compete with another for the attention of 
readers and policy-makers. Naturally, the authors’ rhetoric is a valuable tool to persuade the 
audience of the importance and accuracy of one's own approach and results. In this paper, we 
concentrate on the interaction between attitudes, assessment of research results and rhetoric. 
Economists can present their research and their results in many different ways, neutral or 
judgmental; they might draw policy conclusions from their results or not. All of this might 
have consequences on the public reception of the paper in the science community, but also in 
policy circles.  
                                                                                                                                                        
whether we find an indication that data sets might have been chosen for reasons of persuasion to confirm 
authors’ values and expectations. 
20 When substituting for other indicators for policy conclusions these were insignificant likewise. 
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In contrast to hermeneutic text analysis as practiced in literature21 and in the science of 
history affected by the so-called cultural turn,22 this paper’s consideration of rhetoric has been 
solely quantitative. However, this may be the language economists understand best, anyway. 
We use the example of the rhetoric of the gender wage gap, because the method of the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is universally used in labor economics: we identified almost 
200 papers that have applied it, which makes a quantitative analysis of rhetoric possible. In 
particular, we concentrated on the use of the word “discrimination” and the tendency to draw 
policy conclusions from the analysis. 
 
What are the results?  
        Interestingly, females and U.S. 
authors both use a less explicit terminol-
ogy and are more reluctant to use the 
word “discrimination” when investigating 
the gender wage gap; they may be more 
cautious in interpreting a given phenome-
non in a contentious way. If the calcu-
lated gender wage gap is lower or the 
results appear less reliable, authors refrain 
from strong wording. Likewise, authors 
in top journals use it less often to show 
prudent and scientifically sound behavior. 
On the other hand, policy conclu-
sions economists make are not affected 
by attitudes and values of authors. Irre-
spective of the author’s views about dis-
crimination, the prevalence and severity 
of policy conclusions are the same. Like-
wise, attitudes of authors about discrimi-
nation do not influence their research 
          We find that females and U.S. 
economists use the term “discrimination” 
less often when referring to the gender 
wage gap. Since U.S. economists may 
have stronger believes in the efficiency of 
markets than e.g. Europeans, it does not 
come as a surprise that U.S. authors use a 
more conservative terminology. Women, 
on the other hand, may be less pro-
nounced in their wording to avoid being 
considered preoccupied and in order to 
get their research published in male-
dominated journals. While authors find-
ing high gender wage gaps or having used 
more reliable data or methods speak of 
“discrimination” more often, the contrary 
is true when an article is published in a 
top journal. This may be caused by a 
more conservative editorial policy of 
these journals. 
                                                 
21 For an overview on how economic texts are examined for their form, content and contexts see Woodmansee 
and Osteen (1999). 
22 For new history of science see Dennis (1997). 
 13
strategies. There is no indication that au-
thors who believe that no discrimination 
exists choose a particular data set which 
would be likely to lead to a lower gender 
wage gap. These results are very com-
forting for the economics profession in 
the sense that while the rhetoric of indi-
viduals may differ somewhat, decisions 
concerning research design and policy ad-
vice are not influenced at all. 
Concerning policy recommend-dations, 
demographic variables and objective 
information about the content, methodol-
ogy and results of the research cannot 
explain the variance in the prevalence and 
severity of policy conclusions. There 
must be some – unobservable but fixed – 
factors of ideology which are shaping 
policy advice irrespective of the actual 
result the author has found. Moreover, the 
same unobservable values seem to drive 
empirical methodology in the way how 
authors construct their data sets in order 
to fit their predetermined views. 
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9 Tables 
Table 1: Probability to refer to calculated effect as "discrimination" in text  (marginal 
effects) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female coauthor -0.214   -0.160 -0.170 
    (0.083)    (0.103) (0.103) 
Female  -0.010   0.051 0.033 
   authorship (0.094)   (0.115) (0.117) 
US author(s) -0.244   -0.158 -0.163 
 (0.077)     (0.093) (0.095) 
# of previous  -0.028   0.006 0.002 
   gender papers (0.018)   (0.022) (0.022) 
# of authors -0.038 -0.074 -0.073 -0.009 -0.025 
 (0.064) (0.057) (0.068) (0.079) (0.081) 
Year  -0.013 -0.019 -0.021 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.007) (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.008)  (0.008)  
Calculated   0.735 0.803 0.770 -0.060 
   effect  (0.315)  (0.385)  (0.396) (0.662) 
Top journal  -0.282 -0.346 -0.327 -0.326 
  (0.068)   (0.068)   (0.071)   (0.073)   
Medium journal  -0.092 -0.164 -0.157 -0.164 
  (0.093) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) 
# of prev. papers    -0.324 -0.386 -0.386 -0.377 
   in core 
journals 
 (0.101)   (0.126)   (0.140)   (0.138)   
Sophisticated   0.209 0.199 0.201 0.196 
   method (0 - 1)  (0.091)  (0.106) (0.109) (0.110) 
Good data  0.161 0.184 0.170 -0.034 
   (0 - 4)  (0.053)   (0.061)   (0.063)   (0.137) 
# of estimates 
per  
 0.029 0.030 0.035 0.031 
   study  (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
R2 of wage reg.   0.670 0.687 0.583 
   (0.285)  (0.296)  (0.307) 
Calculated 
Effect  
    1.001 
   * good data     (0.619) 
Observations 191 192 160 159 159 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.26 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 2: Probability to use term "discrimination" in title of paper (marginal effects) 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 
Female coauthor -0.051   -0.048 -0.050 
 (0.078)   (0.094) (0.093) 
Female 
authorship 
-0.170   -0.149 -0.154 
 (0.059)     (0.076) (0.075)  
US author(s) -0.127   -0.146 -0.148 
 (0.065)    (0.080) (0.080) 
# of previous  -0.006   0.012 0.011 
   gender papers (0.014)   (0.019) (0.019) 
# of authors -0.100 -0.062 -0.067 -0.089 -0.095 
 (0.058) (0.049) (0.059) (0.068) (0.069) 
Year  -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Calculated effect  0.059 0.033 -0.007 -0.331 
  (0.268) (0.323) (0.334) (0.569) 
Top journal  -0.025 -0.005 0.021 0.021 
  (0.089) (0.111) (0.120) (0.120) 
Medium journal  -0.019 0.011 0.027 0.024 
  (0.088) (0.106) (0.111) (0.110) 
# of prev. papers   -0.112 -0.098 -0.113 -0.110 
   in core journals  (0.070) (0.078) (0.088) (0.086) 
Sophisticated   0.162 0.199 0.167 0.165 
   Method (0 - 1)  (0.078)  (0.092)  (0.092) (0.092) 
Good data  0.015 0.019 -0.006 -0.078 
   (0 - 4)  (0.043) (0.049) (0.050) (0.112) 
# of estimates per  0.019 0.025 0.024 0.022 
   study  (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
R2 in wage reg.   0.334 0.384 0.344 
   (0.232) (0.241) (0.246) 
Calculated effect 
*  
    0.353 
   good data     (0.494) 
Observations 191 192 160 159 159 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.12 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3: Policy recommendations 
 
 
 Severity 
of policy 
recommendation 
Determination 
of policy  
recommendation 
# of words 
of policy 
recommendation 
 Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Tobit 
"Discrimination" -0.150 -0.227 -0.113 -0.018 -6.128 -4.392 
   in text (0.226) (0.204) (0.240) (0.219) (13.875) (12.763) 
Calculated effect 0.772 0.299 1.002 0.951 25.924 23.416 
 (0.896) (0.792) (0.976) (0.877) (56.262) (51.633) 
Year  0.018 0.002 0.039 0.044 2.788 2.972 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (1.220)  (1.148)  
Female coauthor 0.176 0.312 0.199 -0.039 15.600 9.237 
 (0.285) (0.255) (0.308) (0.277) (17.833) (16.020) 
Female  0.198 0.285 0.315 0.221 7.282 2.937 
   authorship (0.265) (0.246) (0.275) (0.258) (16.000) (15.248) 
 US author(s) 0.060 -0.003 0.146 0.028 19.658 15.231 
 (0.226) (0.199) (0.238) (0.212) (13.712) (12.318) 
 # of authors -0.401 -0.403 -0.549 -0.420 -36.607 -33.261 
 (0.194)  (0.172)  (0.219)  (0.194) (13.300)   (11.866)   
Top journal -0.175 -0.238 -0.329 0.008 -31.883 -16.429 
 (0.353) (0.291) (0.403) (0.324) (23.911) (19.513) 
Medium journal 0.070 0.019 -0.113 0.016 -16.135 0.338 
 (0.302) (0.266) (0.328) (0.291) (19.481) (16.839) 
# of prev. papers  0.077 0.083 -0.013 0.019 -3.631 -3.262 
   in core journals (0.164) (0.146) (0.177) (0.158) (10.683) (9.399) 
# of previous  -0.060 -0.087 -0.060 -0.043 -3.680 -0.003 
   gender papers (0.058) (0.048) (0.072) (0.055) (4.239) (2.957) 
Sophisticated  0.316 0.341 0.371 0.453 27.952 34.372 
   Method (0 - 1) (0.243) (0.216) (0.260) (0.232) (15.003) (13.576)  
Good data 0.034 -0.039 0.045 -0.022 9.079 6.086 
   (0 - 4) (0.137) (0.124) (0.145) (0.133) (8.468) (7.842) 
# of estimates per -0.097 -0.073 -0.155 -0.162 -6.354 -7.613 
   study (0.058) (0.051) (0.064)  (0.059)  (3.610) (3.380)  
R2 of wage reg. -0.071  -0.130 -54.313  
 (0.690)  (0.745)  (43.269)  
Observations 160 192 160 192 160 192 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.03 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4: Use of data restrictions (Ordered Probit) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
“Discrimination”  0.339  0.292 
   in text (0.194)  (0.199) 
# of words of policy 0.001  0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Female coauthor 0.096  0.049 
 (0.238)  (0.242) 
Female authorship 0.210  0.227 
 (0.234)  (0.242) 
US author(s) -0.184  -0.131 
 (0.188)  (0.200) 
# of previous gender 0.058  0.069 
   Papers (0.040)  (0.046) 
# of authors -0.096 -0.072 -0.033 
 (0.157) (0.131) (0.162) 
Year  0.037 0.029 0.033 
 (0.017)  (0.016) (0.017)  
Top journal  -0.615 -0.548 
  (0.258)  (0.266)  
Medium journal  -0.546 -0.576 
  (0.247)  (0.252)  
# of previous papers  0.060 0.031 
   in core journals  (0.117) (0.143) 
Observations 192 192 192 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.06 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5: Calculated effect referred to as discrimination, sex-effect etc., or unexplained 
residual (Ordered Probit) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female  -0.472   -0.199 -0.240 
   coauthor (0.232)    (0.268) (0.270) 
Female  0.226   0.360 0.326 
   authorship (0.225)   (0.262) (0.266) 
US author(s) -0.487   -0.426 -0.425 
 (0.181)     (0.216)  (0.217) 
# of previous     -0.070   -0.011 -0.019 
   gender papers (0.041)   (0.053) (0.053) 
Year  -0.026 -0.030 -0.032 -0.033 -0.035 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
# of authors 0.006 -0.143 -0.075 0.052 0.023 
 (0.152) (0.132) (0.150) (0.180) (0.180) 
Calculated   0.910 0.958 0.806 -1.764 
   effect  (0.750) (0.855) (0.877) (1.415) 
Top journal  -0.814 -1.101 -0.960 -0.968 
  (0.286)   (0.338)   (0.349)   (0.353)   
Medium journal  -0.015 -0.180 -0.194 -0.223 
  (0.246) (0.272) (0.278) (0.280) 
# of prev. papers   -0.335 -0.338 -0.244 -0.281 
   in core 
journals 
 (0.130)   (0.148)  (0.161) (0.163) 
Sophisticated   0.145 0.072 0.104 0.075 
   method  (0.206) (0.230) (0.237) (0.238) 
Good data  0.273 0.308 0.266 -0.372 
  (0.120)  (0.132)  (0.134)  (0.296) 
# of estimates 
per  
 0.080 0.096 0.116 0.099 
   study  (0.049) (0.055) (0.057)  (0.058) 
R2 of wage reg.   1.592 1.614 1.205 
   (0.650)  (0.675)  (0.702) 
Calculated effect      3.246 
   * good data     (1.369)  
Observations 192 192 160 160 160 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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10 Figures 
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Figure 2 
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